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General aviation (14CFR Part 91) accounts for 83% of civil aviation fatalities. While 19 
much research has focused on accident causes/pilot demographics in this aviation sector, 20 
studies to identify factors leading up to the crash (accident-precipitating factors) are few. 21 
Such information could inform on pre-emptive remedial action. With this in mind and 22 
considering the paucity of research on turbine-powered aircraft accidents the study 23 
objectives were to identify accident-precipitating factors and determine if the accident rate 24 
has changed over time for such aircraft operating under 14CFR Part 91. 25 
The NTSB Access database was queried for accidents in airplanes (<12,501 lb) 26 
powered by 1-2 turbine engines and occurring between 1989 and 2013. We developed and 27 
utilized an accident-precipitating factor taxonomy. Statistical analyses employed logistic 28 
regression, contingency tables and a generalized linear model with Poisson distribution.  29 
The “Checklist/Flight Manual Not Followed” was the most frequent accident-30 
precipitating factor category and carried an excess risk (OR 2.34) for an accident with a fatal 31 
and/or serious occupant injury. This elevated risk reflected an over-representation of 32 
accidents with fatal and/or serious injury outcomes (p<0.001) in the “non-adherence to V 33 
Speeds” sub-category. For accidents grouped in the “Inadequate Pre-Flight 34 
Planning/Inspection/Procedure” the “inadequate weather planning” sub-category accounted 35 
(p=0.036) for the elevated risk (OR 2.22) of an accident involving fatal and/or serious 36 
injuries. The “Violation FARs/AIM Deviation” category was also associated with a greater risk 37 
for fatal and/or serious injury (OR 2.59) with “Descent below the MDA/failure to execute the 38 
missed approach” representing the largest sub-category. Accidents in multi-engine aircraft 39 
are more frequent than their single engine counterparts and the decline (50%) in the turbine 40 
aircraft accident rate over the study period was likely due, in part, to a 6 fold increased 41 
representation of single engine airplanes. 42 
In conclusion, our study is the first to identify novel precursive factors for accidents 43 
involving turbine aircraft operating under 14CFR Part 91. This research highlights areas that 44 
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should receive further emphasis in training/recurrency in a pre-emptive attempt to nullify 45 
candidate accident-precipitating factor(s).  46 
 47 
KEYWORDS: general aviation accidents, accident-precipitating factors, turbine aircraft, 48 
injury severity. 49 
  50 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 51 
 General aviation is inclusive of all civilian aviation operations apart from those 52 
involving paid passenger transport. 14CFR Part 91 represents a set of FAA regulations 53 
governing the operation of light, non-commercial aircraft under the general aviation umbrella 54 
within the United States (http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?node=14:2.0.1.3.10). In 55 
contrast, the corresponding 14CFR Part 121 and 135 regulations, apply to airlines and air-56 
taxi operations respectively, and are more stringent. While accidents for the airlines have 57 
dramatically declined over the last 20 years (DeJohn et al., 2013; Li and Baker, 2007), such 58 
a decrease has not been evident for general aviation although preliminary NTSB aviation 59 
data (www.ntsb.gov/news/2014/140915b.html) show a decline in the accident rate for the 60 
most recent year (2013). Nevertheless, general aviation still accounts for the overwhelming 61 
majority (83%) of civil aviation fatalities across the United States (Bazargan and Guzhva, 62 
2011). Furthermore, accidents in this sector carry an associated annual cost of $1.6-4.6 63 
billion to individuals and institutions affected (e.g. family and non-family incurring injury 64 
and/or loss of life, insurance companies, accident investigation costs) inclusive of hospital 65 
costs, loss of pay with a fatal accident and loss of the aircraft (Sobieralski, 2013). It should 66 
be emphasized that these costs do not include litigation expenditures. 67 
Clearly, there is a need to reduce the high accident rate evident for general aviation. 68 
In this regard, the NTSB, as part of its investigative process, assigns a probable cause to 69 
every general aviation accident, for example; controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), spatial 70 
disorientation, loss of control and pilot error (Li et al., 2001; Shkrum et al., 1996). 71 
Noteworthy, loss of control tops the NTSB 2015 “most wanted list” for general aviation 72 
(http://www.ntsb.gov-/safety-/mwl/Documents/MWL_2015_brochure.pdf). Nevertheless, it is 73 
equally important to recognize that accidents are the culmination of one, or more, precursive 74 
factor(s). In fact, across the aviation industry, including airline operations and maintenance 75 
(Rankin et al., 2000), there has been an increasing shift towards identifying precursive 76 
elements by way of programs such as the flight operational quality assurance safety 77 
program (http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives-/atos/air_carrier/foqa/). However, for general 78 
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aviation, studies of pre-accident factors have tended to focus on a limited set of variables 79 
such as weather and light conditions (Ballard et al., 2013; Bazargan and Guzhva, 2007). 80 
Rather, greater emphasis has been placed on determining: (a) the accident cause (Boyd, 81 
2015a; Shao et al., 2014a) (b) pilot flight history/experience/demographics (Bazargan and 82 
Guzhva, 2011; Bennett and Schwirzke, 1992; Groff and Price, 2006; Li et al., 2001; Li et al., 83 
2005; Li and Baker, 1999) and (c) post-accident circumstances (e.g. whether the accident 84 
was on or off-airport (Ballard et al., 2013; Li and Baker, 1999; Rostykus et al., 1998) or 85 
involved a post-impact fire (Ballard et al., 2013; Handel and Yackel, 2011; Li and Baker, 86 
1999)).   87 
General aviation is comprised mainly of piston-driven aircraft with turbine (inclusive of 88 
turboprop and turbojet) aircraft representing the minority. However, in terms of operations, 89 
annual flight hours for turboprop aircraft represent 17% of the  total flight hours for the 90 
combined piston/turboprop fleet operating under Part 91 (2013 General Aviation 91 
Manufacturer’s Association (GAMA) Statistical Databook). Since turbine engine aircraft 92 
represent the minority, it is not surprising that most studies on general aviation accidents 93 
either aggregate aircraft, irrespective of their type of power plant, or focus exclusively on 94 
piston-engine aircraft (Boyd, 2015a; Boyd, 2015b; Shao et al., 2014a; Shao et al., 2014b). 95 
However, caution should be exercised in using findings from such studies to inform on 96 
accidents involving gas-turbine-powered aircraft for several reasons. First, turbine-powered 97 
aircraft are able to fly at higher altitude where there is less control authority of the flight 98 
control surfaces due to the thinner air (Brown and Holt, 2012). Second, at higher altitudes, 99 
there is a greater potential for icing, high level wind shear (associated with jet stream) 100 
(http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation-_industry/airline_operators-/training/media-101 
/Appendix_3-E_-HighAlt-Operations.pdf) and hypoxia. Indeed, 14CFR§61.31 mandate that 102 
airmen flying aircraft at altitudes in excess of 25,000 feet (FL250) in pressurized aircraft 103 
receive training in the critical factors relating to safe flight operations. Finally, turbine engines 104 
have longer engine response (spool up) times compared with their piston-counterparts - an 105 
issue important for balked landings and or missed approaches.  106 
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Considering these gaps in knowledge, the objectives of our study were two-fold (a) 107 
identify the accident-precipitating (also referred herein to as accident-precursive) factors 108 
leading to fatal accidents in turbine aircraft operating under 14CFR Part 91 and (b) 109 
determine if the fatal and all accident rate for turbine aircraft operating under these 110 
regulations has changed over the past 25 years. 111 
2.0 MATERIALS AND METHODS 112 
2.1. Database and Query 113 
 The NTSB (2015 March release) Access database was downloaded 114 
(http://www.ntsb.gov/avdata/Access/) and queried for accidents (operating under 14CFR 115 
Part 091) involving aircraft (<12,501 lb) (airplane category) powered by 1-2 turbine engines 116 
(horsepower 250-2501) and occurring across the 1989-2013 period. Accidents for which the 117 
following type of operations were being conducted were deleted: flights involving ferry 118 
operations, flight instruction, skydiving, flight tests, public utility, aerial observation and air 119 
shows. Additionally the following types of accidents were also excluded: ground personnel 120 
handling of aircraft, a motor vehicle collision with aircraft; during taxiing, injuries external to 121 
the aircraft, preliminary accident reports, stationary aircraft, illegal/criminal flights, aerobatics, 122 
aerial applications, accidents outside of the U.S. for which a NTSB report was not issued, 123 
and where there was lack of agreement by NTSB members as to the final report. 124 
 Data were exported to Excel and, where applicable, de-duplicated in that program. 125 
This strategy returned 551 accidents. A fatal accident was defined as any in which one, or 126 
more, occupants perished within 30 days of the accident (Code of Federal Regulations-127 
49CFR830.2). Serious injuries were defined as per NTSB Form 6120.1 128 
(http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/forms/6120_1web_nopwx.pdf). Minor injuries are defined as any 129 
injury that does not meet the criteria for another injury category per the aforementioned 130 
NTSB form 6120. Of 551 accidents, 313 involved accidents for which occupants sustained 131 




2.2 Taxonomy 134 
 We initially considered using the Human Factors and Classification System (HFACS) 135 
(Shappell and Wiegmann, 2001) for our analysis. However, this application is best suited to 136 
enterprises that have a strong organizational component such as Part 135 or Part 121 137 
operations. Moreover, HFACS requires review of the primary unpublished data for which we 138 
had no access to. Accordingly we developed our own taxonomy based on an analysis of the 139 
NTSB synopsis and factual report corresponding to approximately 100 records. Accident-140 
precipitating factors included, but were not limited to, the subset of contributing factors that 141 
temporally preceded the accident cited by the NTSB in its current synopsis. In this way, a 142 
schema of 17 individual or grouped accident-precipitating factors was developed by the co-143 
authors (both subject matter experts). All 551 accidents were subsequently classified per the 144 
aforementioned taxonomy. Disagreements as to the assignment of a particular accident-145 
precipitating factor or category for an event were discussed until consensus was reached. 146 
2.3 Statistics 147 
 All statistical analyses were performed using the SPSS (version 22) software 148 
package. Multi-variable logistic regression was used to identify accident-precipitating factors 149 
for crashes with fatal and/or serious injury outcomes. Backward elimination, based on a 150 
likelihood ratio test, was first used to eliminate non-contributing variables (p>0.05) to 151 
produce the most parsimonious model but still satisfying the criterion of 10 or more events 152 
per variable (Peduzzi et al., 1996). A check for the biasing effect of collinearity in the 153 
reduced, multi-variable model revealed variance inflation factor values of less than 10 154 
mitigating this concern (Myers, 1990).  155 
 Contingency tables employed Pearson Chi-Square to determine if there was an 156 
overall difference in proportions. P values for cells in multinomial tables were derived from 157 
adjusted standardized residuals (Z-scores) in post-hoc testing.  158 
 To determine if accident rates differed from the earliest period (1989-1993), a 159 
generalized linear model with Poisson Distribution was employed adjusting for differences in 160 
annual turbine fleet flight times for 14CFR Part 91 operations. Sources of fleet activity were: 161 
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for post-1999, the FAA (https://www.faa.gov/data_research/-162 
aviation_data_statistics/general_aviation/) and the 1989-1999 period, GAMA Statistical 163 
Guides (http://www.gama.-aero/media-center/industry-facts-and-statistics/statistical-164 
databook-and-industry-outlook). 165 
3.0 RESULTS 166 
3.1 Accident-Precipitating Factor Categories. 167 
 The NTSB Access database was queried for accidents in aircraft (<12,501 lb) 168 
powered by 1-2 turbine engines and operating under 14CFR Part 91 rules for the period 169 
spanning 1989-2013. This search returned 551 accidents of which 87% involved turbo-prop; 170 
the remaining were comprised of turbojet-powered aircraft. Of the 551 accidents 313 and 171 
238 involved no/minor injuries and fatal/serious injuries respectively. Based on an analysis of 172 
the NTSB synopsis and factual report for approximately 100 records, a total of 17 accident-173 
precipitating factor/categories were derived (Table 1) and used subsequently to categorize 174 
all 551 crashes.  175 
We then sought to identify which of these accident-precipitating factors/categories 176 
carried an increased risk for an accident with a fatal and/or serious injury outcome. As a first 177 
step in this direction, all 17 accident-precipitating factors/categories were subjected to 178 
backward elimination (based on a likelihood ratio test) in logistic regression to eliminate non-179 
contributing variables (Field, 2009) (p>0.05). Using this approach, 11 accident-precipitating 180 
factor/categories meeting this criterion were selected (Table 2). This reduced model was 181 
used to quantify the increased risk (odds ratio or OR) of each variable for an accident with 182 
fatal and/or serious injury outcome (Table 2) while adjusting for the effects of the other 183 
variables. The reduced model predicted 74.8% correct compared with an overall percentage 184 
of 56.8% by chance.  185 
The “Checklist/Flight Manual Not Followed”, was the most frequent accident-186 
precipitating factor category (n=132) and carried an elevated risk (OR 2.34) for an accident 187 
with a fatal and/or serious occupant injury. For accidents grouped in the “Inadequate Pre-188 
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Flight Planning/Inspection/Procedure” or “Violation FARs/AIM Deviation” categories, 189 
occupants were also at greater risk for fatal and/or serious injury (OR 2.22 and 2.59 190 
respectively). While the “Lack of Experience/Systems Knowledge” and “Air Traffic 191 
Control/Flight Service Station Deficiency” categories were implicated in fewer accidents, 192 
nevertheless they also carried an increased risk of a fatal/and or serious injury outcome (OR 193 
5.01 and 6.24 respectively).  194 
3.2 Sub-Classification of Accident-Precipitating Factor Categories. 195 
 Due to the breadth of some of the accident-precursive factor categories, we sub-196 
classified three that carried an elevated risk of an accident with a fatal and/or serious injury 197 
outcome: (a) Checklist/Flight Manual Not Followed” (b) “Inadequate Pre-Flight 198 
Planning/Inspection/Procedure” and (c) FARs Violation/AIM Deviation. Note that the sum of 199 
accidents across the sub-categories (Figures 1-3) is less than that cited for the 200 
corresponding parent category (Table 2) as sub-groups with few accidents were excluded 201 
from the former.  202 
Regarding the “Checklist/Flight Manual Not Followed” category (OR 2.34), four sub-203 
groups were identified (Figure 1). Of these, the “non-adherence to V Speeds” was the most 204 
prevalent sub-category (n=51). Accidents in this sub-group contributed significantly 205 
(p<0.001) to the increased risk (OR 2.34) of accidents involving fatal and/or seriously injured 206 
occupants for the parent category (“Checklist/Flight Manual Not Followed’). Conversely, and 207 
perhaps not surprisingly, accidents grouped in the “landing gear non-extension/premature 208 
retraction” sub-category carried a disproportionate fraction (p<0.001) of occupants 209 
sustaining no and/or minor injuries. 210 
The “Inadequate Pre-Flight Planning/Inspection/Procedure category” (OR 2.22) was 211 
also sub-grouped (Figure 2). For both the “Fuel-Related” and the “Aircraft Pre-flight 212 
Condition” sub-categories, accidents were evenly divided between those in which occupants 213 
incurred fatal and/or serious injuries and those for which occupants sustained no and/or 214 
minor injuries. On the other hand, post-hoc analysis of the sub-categories indicated that the 215 
elevated risk of a fatal and/or serious injury outcome of the parent category was largely 216 
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accounted for by “inadequate weather planning” (p=0.036). This sub-category was 217 
associated with a more than 3 fold increase in accidents with fatal and/or serious injury 218 
outcomes.  219 
 We also sub-classified the FARs Violation/AIM Deviation (OR 2.59) category (Figure 220 
3). The “Descent below the MDA/failure to execute the missed approach” represented the 221 
largest sub-category of accidents (n=27) the majority (78%) of which resulted in fatal and/or 222 
serious injuries. Not surprisingly, as this problem is well recognized in general aviation 223 
(Kenny, 2012), flight from visual to instrument meteorological conditions constituted the 224 
second most common sub-category and again most (91%) of these accidents yielded fatal 225 
and/or serious injuries. In contrast, the overwhelming number (7 of 8) accidents grouped as 226 
“failure to comply with scheduled Inspections/AD/SB,” involved no and/or minor injuries. 227 
3.3 Other Accident-Precipitating Factors. 228 
Several other accident-precursive factor categories were also associated with an 229 
elevated risk for an accident involving fatal and/or serious injuries (Table 2). “Lack 230 
Experience/Systems Knowledge,” an accident-precipitating factor category for 26 accidents 231 
carried an Odds Ratio of 5.01 for a fatal and/or serious injury outcome. Similarly, deficiencies 232 
on the part of Air Traffic Control or the Flight Service Station was cited as an accident-233 
precursive factor for only 14 accidents but nevertheless carried a high risk of an accident 234 
with fatal and/or serious injuries (OR 6.24). Half of the accidents in this category involved the 235 
lack of enroute advisories on adverse weather (convective or icing) or low-terrain alerts. Pilot 236 
Physical/Drug Impairment/Incapacitation (OR 25.07) was also infrequent (n=14) and only 4 237 
of these accidents were due to pilot incapacitation similar to the 1% rate (Li and Baker, 238 
2007) reported elsewhere. Not surprisingly (Bazargan and Guzhva, 2007; Li and Baker, 239 
1999), instrument meteorological conditions/convective weather (OR 5.28) and deficient 240 
lighting conditions (OR 3.89) both carried an excess risk of an accident with fatal and/or 241 
serious occupant injury.  242 
On the other hand, the “Contaminated Runway” (OR 0.10), “Pilot Skill Deficiency” 243 
(0.30) and “Aircraft Malfunction” (OR 0.49) categories all showed reduced risk of an accident 244 
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with a fatal and/or serious injury outcome. Alternatively stated, these accident-precipitating 245 
factor categories were associated with an elevated chance for an outcome with no and/or 246 
minor occupant injury. The findings with the first two accident-precursive factors were not 247 
unexpected since accidents involving the landing and take-off roll rarely carry fatal injuries 248 
(Kenny, 2012) and because we defined “Pilot Skill Deficiency” in context of this phase of 249 
flight (see Table 1). The “Aircraft Malfunction” category comprised 127 events with landing 250 
gear/brake system representing the largest subgroup (n=35) none of which culminated in 251 
fatal and/or serious outcomes. Loss of engine power contributed 30 events with only a 252 
minority (n= 10) resulting in fatal and/or serious injuries. These data parallel the general 253 
aviation fleet, independent of powerplant, showing that the vast majority of accidents 254 
involving a malfunction are non-fatal (Kenny, 2012). 255 
3.4 Temporal Change in Turbine-Powered Aircraft Accident Rate and the Fraction of 256 
Accidents with Fatal/Serious Injuries. 257 
 We then determined if accident rates in turbine aircraft operating under 14CFR Part 258 
91 rules have changed over the 1989-2013 period of the current study. Indeed, adjusting for 259 
the variations in annual turbine fleet activity conducted under 14CFR Part 91, a steady 260 
decline in the accident rate was evident over the 25 year period (Figure 4-line graph). 261 
Specifically, the accident rate for the 1989-1993 period was 4.3 (per million flight hours), but 262 
declined by over 50% for the most recent (2009-2013) period. A generalized linear model 263 
with Poisson distribution revealed that the difference between the first (1989-1993) and last 264 
(2009-2013) periods was statistically significant (p<0.001). 265 
 In contrast, the fraction of accidents corresponding to fatal and/or serious occupant 266 
injury outcome was largely unchanged between the 1980-1993 (49%) and 1999-2003 (48%) 267 
periods after which a decline was evident. For the most recent period (2009-2013) 29.7% of 268 
accidents resulted in fatal and/or serious occupant injury. Post-hoc analysis indicated that for 269 
the most recent time period the reduced fraction of accidents with fatal and/or serious injury 270 
was statistically significant (p=0.005).  271 
3.5 Temporal Decrease in the Fraction of Accidents in Twin-Engine Turbine Aircraft. 272 
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 We were curious as to the reason(s) underlying the decrease in all and fatal/serious 273 
accident rates. Since we, and others (Boyd, 2015a; Kenny, 2012), have previously reported 274 
both a higher all accident and fatal accident rate for multi-engine aircraft (albeit piston-275 
powered aircraft) we hypothesized that the aforementioned decrease may reflect a shift in 276 
the proportion of accident aircraft from a twin to single engine configuration over time. 277 
Indeed this proved to be the case (Figure 6). The percentage of accidents in single engine 278 
turbine aircraft operating under 14CFR Part 91 steadily increased from 7% for the 1989-279 
1993 time frame to 46% for the most recent period (2009-2013). A Chi-Square test showed 280 
that this shift in the overall distribution of twin/single engine aircraft accidents was statistically 281 
significant (Pearson Chi-Square p<0.001). We entertained the notion that the increased 282 
representation of single engine aircraft accidents over time had the consequence of a lower 283 
stall speed and hence a lesser impact force on occupants in an accident (impact force is a 284 
function of the square of velocity (Freitas, 2014)). However our data (not shown) indicated 285 
no statistical difference in stall speeds (VSO) across the time periods. 286 
4.0 CONCLUSIONS 287 
 Although there has been an increased focus on identifying accident-precursive 288 
events for airline operations ((http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/atos-/air_carrier/foqa/) and 289 
(Rankin et al., 2000)) there has been little corresponding effort for the general aviation 290 
sector. Herein, in a study of crashes involving turbine-powered aircraft operating under 291 
14CFR part 91 we have identified several novel accident-precipitating factors associated 292 
with fatal and/or serious injury outcomes. 293 
“Non-adherence to V speeds” was the most frequent accident-precipitating factor 294 
within the “Checklist/Flight Manual Not Followed“ category and carried the highest fraction of 295 
accidents with a fatal and/or serious injury outcome. Operating at an inappropriate airspeed 296 
could be due to either (a) intended/inadvertent deviation from published values or (b) not 297 
recognizing that many of these specified values vary under a range of loading/configuration 298 
and/or ambient conditions (e.g. increased bank angle results in an increased stall speed). 299 
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However, NTSB reports lack data that would allow us to determine which of these two 300 
scenarios were applicable to the airman involved in a particular accident.  301 
The limitations of V speeds and importantly pilot knowledge (or lack thereof) on this 302 
topic deserve discussion. In context of aerodynamic stalls, V speeds are surrogates for 303 
angle of attack and stalls can occur at any speed. Installation of angle of attack indicators, as 304 
advocated by the NTSB (http://www.ntsb.gov/safety-/mwl/Pages/mwl7_2015.aspx), is one 305 
strategy that should mitigate accidents caused by aerodynamic stalls. For operations in 306 
turbulence, while reducing speed to prevent over-stress of the airframe is well recognized, 307 
again, the target speed to be achieved warrants comment. A common practice, at least for 308 
light aircraft (<12,500 lbs), is to reduce airspeed to maneuvering speed (VA) a value 309 
specified in the flight manual (only a subset of aircraft flight manuals reference a turbulence-310 
penetration speed -VB). However this approach is fraught with limitations since (a) airspeed 311 
fluctuates in turbulence (Schiff, 2001) and any attempt to achieve VA will result in an over-312 
speed condition and (b) VA decreases with lower aircraft weight and flight manuals may 313 
specify only that speed corresponding to maximum weight. Equally important for flight in 314 
turbulence, adherence to the appropriate V speed may still not protect against structural 315 
failure in the event of simultaneous control inputs in different axes 316 
(http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/-317 
handbooks_manuals/aviation/pilot_handbook/media/PHAK-Errata-Sheet.pdf). Another V 318 
speed meriting discussion is minimum controllable speed (VMC) in the event of engine failure 319 
in a multi-engine aircraft. Airmen need to be particularly cognizant as to the offsets of the 320 
published VMC values by aircraft weight, ambient conditions and flap/landing gear 321 
configuration. This is of particular importance since, too often, accidents in multi-engine 322 
aircraft occur as a consequence of poor single engine procedures inclusive of inappropriate 323 
speed selection (Boyd, 2015a). Taken together, discussions with pilots should include 324 
greater emphasis on the importance of appropriate V speed selection corresponding to a 325 
phase of flight but nevertheless, the limitations of such speeds (especially in context of 326 
aerodynamic stalls) and finally the fact that published values are rarely constant. 327 
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Adverse weather (instrument meteorological conditions or convective activity) is a 328 
well-documented risk factor for fatal general aviation accidents (Bazargan and Guzhva, 329 
2007; Li and Baker, 1999). Moreover, pilots are more likely to continue a planned flight 330 
without diverting or returning to the departure airport after the mid-way point of the trip (Batt 331 
and O'Hare, 2005; O'Hare and Owen, 2002) a phenomenon referred to as “plan continuation 332 
bias.” Thus, pre-departure weather planning can be crucial for a successful flight outcome. 333 
However, the disproportionate number of accidents with fatal and/or serious injury outcomes 334 
involving inadequate weather planning (no evidence of an official weather briefing) argues 335 
that a subset of airmen operating turbine-powered aircraft are placing insufficient emphasis 336 
on such planning. Of course we cannot exclude the possibility that some of these pilots did 337 
receive weather information from sources other than official FAA sources (Flight Service 338 
Station or the internet-based DUATS). Nevertheless, these findings would argue for the 339 
importance of comprehensive pre-flight planning in context of weather evaluation. That said, 340 
weather can change rapidly and current conditions may deviate from those forecast. In this 341 
regard, a long well-recognized problem plaguing general aviation (Kenny, 2012) is the 342 
continued flight from visual to instrument meteorological conditions also evidenced in our 343 
study. Typically such events are fatal- in our study 90% of accidents in which this accident-344 
precipitating factor was cited involved fatal and/or seriously injured occupants. Interestingly 345 
of the 11 accidents, the pilots for all but one of the aircraft were instrument-certified. This 346 
finding suggests that in the face of deteriorating weather airmen should be strongly 347 
encouraged to request an enroute clearance. 348 
We found that the largest number of accidents in the “FAR Violation/AIM Deviation” 349 
category was attributed to a “Descent below MDA/failure to execute the Missed” the majority 350 
(78%) of which resulted in fatal and/or serious injuries. This problem may be rooted in two 351 
different causes. First, turbine aircraft are often faster than piston-powered aircraft 352 
comparable in terms of passenger capacity. Second, turbine engines are characterized by 353 
longer response (spool up) times compared with piston-powered aircraft (Brown and Holt, 354 
2012). Thus, decision-making as to whether to break off an approach in degraded visibility 355 
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has to be expeditious even more so for turbine aircraft requiring only one pilot. Moreover, 356 
current regulations allow airmen operating under 14CFR Part 91 to do a “look see” even if 357 
the current broadcast visibility is below minimums. Taken together, due consideration should 358 
be given to modifying the regulations for turbine operators operating under 14CFR Part 91 to 359 
prohibit instrument approaches when the automated weather broadcast indicates below 360 
minimums. Indeed, for operations conducted under 14CFR Part 135/121 an instrument 361 
approach cannot be commenced under such weather conditions. 362 
As an accident-precursive factor, “Deficiencies on part of Air Traffic Control or the 363 
Flight Service Station” were rare (n=14) but nevertheless carried a high risk of a fatal and/or 364 
serious injury outcome. Half of the accidents in this category involved the lack of enroute 365 
advisories on adverse weather (convective or icing) or low-terrain alerts. We speculate that 366 
the growing presence of on-board data-linked weather and terrain-alerting systems may 367 
prove efficacious in nullifying this accident-precursive factor in the future.  368 
We were initially surprised that pilot fatigue was not identified as a candidate 369 
accident-precipitating factor. That said, it is likely that the role of fatigue is grossly 370 
underestimated for several reasons. First, 14CFR Part 91 operations lack regulations 371 
pertaining to pilot rest unlike 14CFR Part 121 where rest requirements are mandatory. 372 
Airmen operating under 14CFR Part 91 must therefore exercise self-discipline and should be 373 
made aware of technologies available for monitoring sleep. Further, in a non-fatal accident 374 
investigation pilots are unlikely to admit fatigue as a factor for fear of punitive action by 375 
aviation authorities and/or civil litigation. 376 
The finding of a steady decline in the accident rate of turbine-powered aircraft over 377 
the 25 year period was surprising and in contrast to an unchanged rate for the aggregated 378 
general aviation fleet (Kenny, 2012). One possible explanation for the decline is that aviation 379 
safety in this sector is improving. Alternatively, the reduction in fatal accident rate for turbine-380 
powered aircraft operating under 14CFR Part 91 may be related, in part, to an increasing 381 
proportion of single engine accident aircraft over time. Certainly, based on prior studies with 382 
piston aircraft (Kenny, 2012), both the all-accident and fatal accident rates for multi-engine 383 
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aircraft is higher than the corresponding rate for single engine aircraft. Our data are 384 
consistent with the latter notion which clearly demonstrated an increased representation of 385 
single engine turbine aircraft over the study period. Nevertheless, we recognize that other 386 
co-variates, not captured in the present study, could also contribute to the decline in the 387 
accident rate reported herein.  388 
Notwithstanding our findings, our study had limitations. First and foremost, this was a 389 
retrospective study. Also, assigning an accident-precipitating factor or category to an 390 
accident was not always clear-cut. Another limitation is that we made the assumption that 391 
the increased fraction of accidents in single turbine engine aircraft evident over time reflects 392 
a proportionate increase in fleet activity by these aircraft. Also, we recognize that a low 393 
number of events, especially where accident-precipitating factor categories were sub-394 
classified, would have resulted in a loss of statistical power. Finally, since the FAA lacked 395 
fleet flight time for the 2011 year, denominator data for the 2009-2013 period represents an 396 
average of these years with the exclusion of the corresponding data for 2011.  397 
In conclusion, our study is the first to identify novel precursive factors for accidents 398 
involving turbine aircraft operating under 14CFR Part 91. Our findings point to areas that 399 
should receive increased emphasis in training/recurrency in a pre-emptive attempt to nullify 400 
the effect of candidate accident-precipitating factor(s). Increased attention should be given 401 
by airmen to adherence to checklists/flight manuals and in particular recommended V 402 
speeds, their limitations and the need to adjust for modifying variables. In a similar vein, 403 
airmen should exercise greater diligence in pre-flight weather planning especially when 404 
convective weather and instrument meteorological conditions are forecast. Further, with 405 
typically higher aircraft speeds and longer engine spool up times (Brown and Holt, 2012) (a) 406 
airmen should receive training as to decision-making with reference to decision height for 407 
instrument approaches under minimum weather conditions and (b) aviation authorities 408 
should consider whether conducting approaches under conditions below broadcast 409 
minimums should be prohibited for turbine operations.   410 
17 
 
5.0 LEGENDS 411 
FIGURES 412 
Figure 1. Sub-Classification of Non-Adherence to Checklist/Flight Manual Category. 413 
  The number of accidents (n) is specified above each column. 414 
Figure 2. Inadequate Pre-Flight Planning/Inspection/Procedure Sub-Categorization. 415 
 Accidents in the “Inadequate Pre-Flight Planning/Inspection/Procedure” category 416 
(Table 2) was sub-grouped. The number of accidents (n) is indicated above each column. 417 
Figure 3. Sub-Classification of the FARs Violation/AIM Deviation Category. 418 
 The number of accidents (n) is indicated above each column. Abbreviations: MDA, 419 
minimum descent altitude; AD, airworthiness directive; SB, service bulletin. 420 
Figure 4. Temporal change in Turbine-Powered Aircraft Accident Rates and the Fraction of 421 
Accidents with Fatal/Serious Injuries. 422 
 Accidents (n) for turbine-powered aircraft for the indicated time period were 423 
normalized to turbine fleet activity operating under 14CFR Part 91 for the corresponding 424 
period and depicted as accident rate (line graph). The bar graph represents the fraction of 425 
accidents with fatal and/or serious injuries for the indicated period is shown. A fraction of 0.4 426 
means that of 40% of the accidents for the specified time period involved occupants with 427 
fatal/and or serious injuries. The number (n) of accidents with fatal and/or serious injury 428 
outcomes is included above each column. 429 
Figure 5. Accidents of Turbine-Powered Aircraft Segregated by Single and Twin-Engine 430 
Configuration. 431 
 The number (n) of accidents by turbine-powered aircraft operating under 14CFR Part 432 
91 separated by single and twin-engine aircraft for the indicated time period is shown. 433 




Table 1. Taxonomy and Explanation of Accident-Precipitating Factor Categories. 436 
 Abbreviations: Wx-weather, FBO, fixed base operator; FARs, federal aviation 437 
regulations; AIM, Airman Information Manual; FOD, foreign object damage; ATC, air traffic 438 
control; FSS, flight service station; IFR, instrument flight rules. 439 
Table 2. Risk Assessment of the Accident-Precipitating Factors for a Crash with a Fatal 440 
and/or Serious Injury Outcome. 441 
 Variables from Table 1, which in backward elimination using Log Likelihood ratio test 442 
reached a statistical level of (p<0.05), were then analysed by logistic regression for risk of an 443 
accident with a fatal and/or serious injury outcome. 444 
 445 
 446 
.  447 
 448 
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ACCIDENT-PRECIPITATING 
FACTOR CATEGORY ACCIDENT-PRECIPITATING FACTOR/ CATEGORY EXPLANATION
1 Checklist/Flight Manual Not Followed self-explanatory and includes non-adherence to V speeds
2 Contaminated Runway Runway contaminated with water, snow or ice
3 WX/Aircraft Icing/Frost/Snow
Weather conditions included icing, frost or snow or aircraft was contaminated by 
these elements
4 Improper/inadequate maintenance/Inadequate Inspection
improper or inadequate maintenance or inadequate Inspection by maintenance 
facility
5 Inadequate Inflight Planning/Decision Making Inadequate inflight planning or inadequate decision making by pilot
6 Inadequate Pre-flight Planning/Inspection/Procedure
Failure to undertake comprehensive pre-flight planning or aircraft pre-flight 
inspection or a procedure associated with the latter
7 Instrument meteorological conditions or Convective Weather instrument meteorological conditions or thunderstorms
8 Deficient Lighting ambient lighting that is anything but daylight
9 Deficiency by Operator/Owner/FBO deficiency on part of the operator or owner or fixed base operator 
10 Violation Federal Airman Regulations (FARs)/Airman Information Manual (AIM) Deviation
Inclusive of: a descent below minimum altitude of an instrument procedure, 
weather below minimums  than those prescribed in the approach chart, continued 
flight from visual to instrument meteorological conditions in the absence of an IFR 
flight plan, flight into known icing, outdated aeronautical charts, pilot flying was 
non-instrument certified pilot, aircraft was modified in an unapproved fashion, non-
compliance with an airworthiness directive or service bulletin, under visual 
conditions an aircraft did not give right of way to converging aircraft, aircraft was 
unairworthy
11 Diverted Attention Pilot was distracted 
12 Malfunction (includes FOD) Aircraft malfunction including damage caused by foreign object
13 Lack Experience/Systems Knowledge
Lack of experience or lack of systems knowledge on part of the pilot  for the 
accident aircraft
14 Fatigue crew member fatigue
15 ATC/FSS Deficiency Deficiency on part of Air Traffic Control or the Flight Service Station
16 Pilot Physical/Drug Impairment/Incapacitation Pilot impairment physically or by medications or pilot incapacitation
17 Pilot Skill Deficiency
Pilot skill in context of hand/foot-eye coordination in context of landing or take-
offs
Table 1
Accident Precipitating Factor/Category n Wald p Value Odds Ratio Lower Upper
Checklist/Flight Manual Not Followed 132 13.97 <0.001 2.34 1.48 3.69
Contaminated Runway 22 8.39 0.004 0.10 0.02 0.48
Inadequate Pre-flight 
Planning/Inspection/Procedure 68 7.13 0.008 2.22 1.24 3.98
Instrument meterological conditions or Convective 
Weather 90 27.12 <0.001 5.28 2.82 9.88
Deficient Lighting 50 11.91 0.001 3.89 1.80 8.43
Violation FARs/AIM deviation 64 6.96 0.008 2.59 1.28 5.24
Malfunction 127 7.54 0.006 0.49 0.30 0.82
Lack Experience/Systems Knowledge 26 9.63 0.002 5.01 1.81 13.87
Air Traffic Control/Flight Service Station 
Deficiency 14 4.92 0.026 6.24 1.24 31.43
Pilot Physical/Drug Impairment/Incapacitation 14 9.26 0.002 25.07 3.15 199.74
Pilot Skill Deficiency 39 5.23 0.022 0.30 0.11 0.84
95% Confidence Intervals
Table 2
